No problem! Not offended in the slightest =P

Yah I mean I’m not trying to make people feel bad about not doing more (though should we feel bad?).

I think it’s safe to say though that lots of people (both philosophers and non-philosophers) disagree on this.

For example, I’m currently taking a course on feminist ethics/philosophy, and there is one feminist philosopher who says that unless we can first fulfill all our moral obligations to people directly in our lives, we do not have moral obligations to, say, anyone in the third world who is far away from us and essentially strangers.

Thanks for your comments!

Just to clarify, I don’t believe I ever said that not flipping off the switch in the train scenario is in any way morally equivalent to the inaction of saving the people who are dying of poverty – those are two different situations, and your moral obligations would of course be different.

The basic thing I am trying to say is that if you believe in a moral system where it is both bad to inflict harm or to not prevent harm to someone else when you can, then clearly, you have moral obligations to do both.

Of course, how “strong” those moral obligations are depends on many factors, like some of the things you mentioned. So for example, if you are wealthier than someone else, you would probably have a greater moral obligation to donate time/money to help poverty-stricken individuals in the third world. That’s not to say that someone less wealthy has zero moral obligation, just probably less.

But my greater point in the article, and probably the most non-intuitive one, is that if you agree with everything I’ve said so far, then you are technically not being as moral as possible anytime you ignore doing an activity that you would have a great moral obligation to than what you choose to do instead.

For example, let’s say you are walking outside, and you see a starving person and a basketball – you have the choice of doing either. You would be more morally obligated to feed the starving person than to play basketball, and thus, some would argue that it would be immoral of you to play basketball instead of help that person.

Now, let’s say that starving person was in a third world country, miles and miles away. And the basketball is still there in front of you. Would you be more morally obligated to help the starving person in the third world than to play basketball? Assuming you have the means necessary, I think you would. But I would say that your moral obligations to someone starving in the third world are probably less than your moral obligations to someone starving here, because it is easier for you to help out someone here, and since your capability to address that need improves by it occurring closer to home, your obligation to it increases.

However, just because it can be difficult for you to help someone in the third world, that doesn’t mean the obligation is not there or does not exist (it’s just significantly less).

After I read through this blog, I actually immediately went and asked my mom what she thought about this. (uncool or whatever, I know, but my parents have good philosophical thoughts on life and it’s free to tap their wisedom right?)Anyways, she said that inaction in not flipping off the switch in the train scenario is not morally equivalent to the inaction of saving the people who are dying of poverty etc. because in the train scenario the responsibility of saving the person’s life rests soley on you (no one else is able to change the result) versus in the inaction to help people dying in third world countries, it’s not your action or inaction that will change the result so completely. Thus the two situations are “morally inequivalent”. I really agree with her (at the end of her arguement anyways; your reasoning was very logical and convincing as well)I think the moral responsibility to the dying people is divided up between all the others who are well off and can afford to help. The responsibility is obvious very heavy but divided among so many people (combined with our distance from them and how it isn’t immediate)the weight feels a lot lighter. This can be compared to psychology class where they talk about how it is proven that reaction time is significantly slower when a large number of people are watching someone get hurt versus just one. In many of those cases most people in the crowd assumes that someone else has alrerady called 911 or the ambulance. So ironically when you’re suffering a stab wound on the ground it might be better for your situation if there is less people around.

Yah, I realize it sounds extreme to say that watching a movie is immoral, and it feels weird to think of it in such a way. Yet I cannot seem to justify the idea that we are obligated to prevent a known harm whenever possible (e.g. flipping a switch to immediately save lives) yet we are not morally obligated to help the millions of people requiring help in a variety of forms in our communities, both locally and globally. I can see no other way than to admit that we are morally obligated to help others, even if they are far away or hard to help.

But you’re right – it is about balance. And each of us finds balance in a different way. So while I do believe that in the “technical” sense I am being immoral when I do not spend my time helping others, I don’t necessarily equate that with being an awful human being.

The reason I think this is confusing is because of the concept of immediacy. If we see a train going to hit a person, then we think it is immoral to not try and stop it if we can – due to the immediacy and actually being there. If someone was dying of hunger in front of you, would you not feel morally obligated to help? Well, what if that person was 10,000 km away, are you less morally obligated to help? I would say yes you are less morally obligated to help to some degree, but you are still morally obligated to help to an extent.

I agree with your overall viewpoint here. I’d like to think that we have moral obligations to both ourselves and those around us.

At the same time, whether or not moral obligations are real in the first place is a discussion on its own (if someone has thoughts on this, please tell!).

I agree that not preventing harm is not necessarily immoral depending on the circumstances – in the same way, however, sometimes it may not be immoral to cause harm (e.g. someone decides to shoot you, and so you shoot them first instead). So my question is more for looking at morality in general, and what our general moral obligations are.

I thought a lot about the stuff you mentioned about the ease with which we can meet our moral obligations, and as I wrote in my next article on this issue, I feel that the ease with which we can meet our moral obligations (e.g. helping others in the third world) affects the degree of those moral obligations. So in essence, I think that yes it is more immoral to choose not to flip a switch that can help others than to choose not to donate 100 hours of your time to produce the same result.

The bottom line is that life is all about striking a balance. Enjoy yourself, but at the same time, be mindful of your role as a global citizen.