Action vs Inaction – Are they Morally Equivalent?

Posted by Joshua
December 3, 2008

Today I read about a hypothetical scenario that I’m struggling with, and not exactly sure yet how I feel about it.

Hypothetical scenario 1: A person is tied to a train track and a train is going to run the person over. There is a switch that controls the train. If you flip the switch, the train will stop. If you don’t, the person will die.

Hypothetical Scenario 2: Same situation as above, but in this case, the switch is off and the train isn’t moving. If you flip the switch on, the train will start to move and kill the person on the track.

Is not flipping the switch in #1 just as morally wrong as flipping the switch in #2?

I would say that you are morally obligated to not harm / let the person be harmed in both scenarios. Yet I initially struggled with the idea of moral equivalency for this situation. Could action to hurt ever be equally bad as inaction against harm?

In case #2, if we flip the switch, then we essentially desire the person to die. In case #1, if we choose to not stop flip the switch and stop the train, this does not necessitate that we desired the person to die – it could also mean that we did not feel a moral obligation to save the person’s life (but in that case, we don’t share the same moral values), or that even if we did, we chose not to act on it. So initially, it felt as if flipping the switch in #2 was worse if we took complete intentions into account.

However, if we are just looking at just morality, I guess one could argue that it is morally correct to act on your moral obligations. Therefore, in #2, we are morally obligated not to kill, and in #1, we are morally obligated to prevent death – in that respect, you could argue both action (#2) and inaction (#1) are morally equivalent and equally wrong.

Yet legally, there is a clear distinction between how we would treat an individual in those circumstances – in general, you can’t really be charged with a crime for inaction for such situations (but if you have any interesting spots where you can, let me know). For instance, if this exact situation was presented in court, I would think you could only jail the person who flipped the switch in #2.

A bigger question, however, emerges if we extrapolate inaction into a larger sense. Right now some people in third world countries are dying of hunger, disease, etc. Am I committing an immoral act by sitting here and typing this at my computer instead of directly contributing to improving their lives?

Now that might sound ridiculous at first, but that’s probably because humans tend to feel stronger about immediate events and results – such as actually being at the train tracks with the switch and a person about to die. Besides not being able to visualize it in real time, how is my inaction right now any different from not acting to help?

However, the idea that anytime I am watching a movie is immoral seems pretty ridiculous to me. The question we must then ask is: Are we actually morally obligated to do anything? If so, how can we act on our moral obligations in some cases but not others?

I am definitely not an expert or anything on moral theory – these are ideas I struggle with, and I’d be interested in hearing different opinions, insights, and perspectives on these issues.

What do you think?

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Comments

Now that’s deep. I wouldn’t argue that the two are equally wrong simply because not doing something can be a result of shock, uncertainty, paralysis. Whereas if you do it, it is assumed to be done with intention. I realize that matters like this are not cut out in black and white like that, but that’s just my two cents on it.

For your analogy to third world countries, I personally think that at such a large scale, the majority of people are not motivated enough to take action. I mean, there are some direction-driven people in the world who will take action, but not enough of them. Whereas if one could save all the people in third world countries from dying by the flick of a switch, I’m sure there would be no more suffering in the world.

But it doesn’t work that way.

People don’t want to have to put effort into long-term projects. If the result is not immediate, they won’t go out of their way to do something. It’s unfortunate, and it’s proof of our laziness as a people.

Comment by Alice on December 3, 2008 @ 7:53 pm

I believe we are morally obligated to our fellow humans. Therefore, we should be focused on helping them.

But then I also believe it is a fact that we are humans — limitedly capable and finite. Additionally, if we lived to focus on our neighbors, when do we ever focus on ourselves? Is there a moral dischord between caring for the self as opposed to caring for the community? It’s a fine line, and one that we all have drawn.

I believe that we are obligated to live our lives in such a fashion that will enable us to continually live in concern for others.

Comment by Nate on December 4, 2008 @ 1:38 am

I think that it has a lot to do with the choice of words. Saying that watching pointless movies is an “immoral act” is a bit extreme. It could be more appropriately termed unproductive, futile, or frivolous.

The bottom line is that life is all about striking a balance. Enjoy yourself, but at the same time, be mindful of your role as a global citizen.

Comment by Nadia on December 4, 2008 @ 4:03 pm

Hi Alice,

I agree that not preventing harm is not necessarily immoral depending on the circumstances – in the same way, however, sometimes it may not be immoral to cause harm (e.g. someone decides to shoot you, and so you shoot them first instead). So my question is more for looking at morality in general, and what our general moral obligations are.

I thought a lot about the stuff you mentioned about the ease with which we can meet our moral obligations, and as I wrote in my next article on this issue, I feel that the ease with which we can meet our moral obligations (e.g. helping others in the third world) affects the degree of those moral obligations. So in essence, I think that yes it is more immoral to choose not to flip a switch that can help others than to choose not to donate 100 hours of your time to produce the same result.

Comment by Joshua on December 4, 2008 @ 9:59 pm

Hi Nate,

I agree with your overall viewpoint here. I’d like to think that we have moral obligations to both ourselves and those around us.

At the same time, whether or not moral obligations are real in the first place is a discussion on its own (if someone has thoughts on this, please tell!).

Comment by Joshua on December 4, 2008 @ 10:02 pm

Hi Nadia,

Yah, I realize it sounds extreme to say that watching a movie is immoral, and it feels weird to think of it in such a way. Yet I cannot seem to justify the idea that we are obligated to prevent a known harm whenever possible (e.g. flipping a switch to immediately save lives) yet we are not morally obligated to help the millions of people requiring help in a variety of forms in our communities, both locally and globally. I can see no other way than to admit that we are morally obligated to help others, even if they are far away or hard to help.

But you’re right – it is about balance. And each of us finds balance in a different way. So while I do believe that in the “technical” sense I am being immoral when I do not spend my time helping others, I don’t necessarily equate that with being an awful human being.

The reason I think this is confusing is because of the concept of immediacy. If we see a train going to hit a person, then we think it is immoral to not try and stop it if we can – due to the immediacy and actually being there. If someone was dying of hunger in front of you, would you not feel morally obligated to help? Well, what if that person was 10,000 km away, are you less morally obligated to help? I would say yes you are less morally obligated to help to some degree, but you are still morally obligated to help to an extent.

Comment by Joshua on December 4, 2008 @ 10:09 pm

Hi Josh,

After I read through this blog, I actually immediately went and asked my mom what she thought about this. (uncool or whatever, I know, but my parents have good philosophical thoughts on life and it’s free to tap their wisedom right?)Anyways, she said that inaction in not flipping off the switch in the train scenario is not morally equivalent to the inaction of saving the people who are dying of poverty etc. because in the train scenario the responsibility of saving the person’s life rests soley on you (no one else is able to change the result) versus in the inaction to help people dying in third world countries, it’s not your action or inaction that will change the result so completely. Thus the two situations are “morally inequivalent”. I really agree with her (at the end of her arguement anyways; your reasoning was very logical and convincing as well)I think the moral responsibility to the dying people is divided up between all the others who are well off and can afford to help. The responsibility is obvious very heavy but divided among so many people (combined with our distance from them and how it isn’t immediate)the weight feels a lot lighter. This can be compared to psychology class where they talk about how it is proven that reaction time is significantly slower when a large number of people are watching someone get hurt versus just one. In many of those cases most people in the crowd assumes that someone else has alrerady called 911 or the ambulance. So ironically when you’re suffering a stab wound on the ground it might be better for your situation if there is less people around.

Comment by Tina on March 20, 2009 @ 9:55 am

Hey Tina,

Thanks for your comments!

Just to clarify, I don’t believe I ever said that not flipping off the switch in the train scenario is in any way morally equivalent to the inaction of saving the people who are dying of poverty – those are two different situations, and your moral obligations would of course be different.

The basic thing I am trying to say is that if you believe in a moral system where it is both bad to inflict harm or to not prevent harm to someone else when you can, then clearly, you have moral obligations to do both.

Of course, how “strong” those moral obligations are depends on many factors, like some of the things you mentioned. So for example, if you are wealthier than someone else, you would probably have a greater moral obligation to donate time/money to help poverty-stricken individuals in the third world. That’s not to say that someone less wealthy has zero moral obligation, just probably less.

But my greater point in the article, and probably the most non-intuitive one, is that if you agree with everything I’ve said so far, then you are technically not being as moral as possible anytime you ignore doing an activity that you would have a great moral obligation to than what you choose to do instead.

For example, let’s say you are walking outside, and you see a starving person and a basketball – you have the choice of doing either. You would be more morally obligated to feed the starving person than to play basketball, and thus, some would argue that it would be immoral of you to play basketball instead of help that person.

Now, let’s say that starving person was in a third world country, miles and miles away. And the basketball is still there in front of you. Would you be more morally obligated to help the starving person in the third world than to play basketball? Assuming you have the means necessary, I think you would. But I would say that your moral obligations to someone starving in the third world are probably less than your moral obligations to someone starving here, because it is easier for you to help out someone here, and since your capability to address that need improves by it occurring closer to home, your obligation to it increases.

However, just because it can be difficult for you to help someone in the third world, that doesn’t mean the obligation is not there or does not exist (it’s just significantly less).

Comment by Joshua on March 20, 2009 @ 2:01 pm

Josh, whoa, so sorry about that! I totally put words in your mouth there! Again I totally apologize, I hope you’re not too offended, I had no intention of doing that.
I guess after I read this, the prominent question in my mind was how immoral is not helping the third world country people and is it the same as the not saving the person and so that became the main (and wrong)thing I remembered about the article. Anyways I’m sorry dude, that was my bad.

Comment by Tina on March 20, 2009 @ 3:16 pm

Hey Tina,

No problem! Not offended in the slightest =P

Yah I mean I’m not trying to make people feel bad about not doing more (though should we feel bad?).

I think it’s safe to say though that lots of people (both philosophers and non-philosophers) disagree on this.

For example, I’m currently taking a course on feminist ethics/philosophy, and there is one feminist philosopher who says that unless we can first fulfill all our moral obligations to people directly in our lives, we do not have moral obligations to, say, anyone in the third world who is far away from us and essentially strangers.

Comment by Joshua on March 20, 2009 @ 4:53 pm

but freeing the person from being on the track really solves the whole problem.
maybe this could be why there are problems with the third world and such, because fundemental change did not occur and by-standers keep on debating the pros and cons, in some cases personal gain. (by that i don’t mean you joshua :D , i mean certain world leaders)

Comment by chocofusion on April 4, 2009 @ 7:47 pm

I think the saying “A man’s toothache takes precedence over millions dying of starving 1000 miles around” (or something like that) says it all.

Comment by Rebecca on June 5, 2009 @ 11:18 pm
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